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Abstract 
 
 
 
As residential energy markets open to competition, consumers can choose from a range of 
tariffs offered by different suppliers.  We examine the relationship between the fixed charge 
levied on each consumer, and the variable charge per unit of energy used across all these 
tariffs.  Data are the tariffs offered in April 2002 in the 14 electricity regions of Great Britain 
by seventeen suppliers, seven of whom operate nationally.  Our analysis focuses on the 
revenue trade-off for the company.  We identify the effect of payment method on the 
relationship between fixed and variable charge.  We find significant effects of the distribution 
and transmission charges which the suppliers pay in each area, as well as the size of the 
market both by number of customers and area; and confirm that incumbents charge 
significantly more that entrants. We also find significant differences between the prepayment 
and credit tariffs.   
 
 
JEL : D430, L940, C310. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Public utility monopolies have traditionally raised revenue through a two-part tariff consisting of a 
standing charge or line rental, which must be paid to gain access to the utility; and a unit price or 
running rate for each unit consumed.  This was virtually universal in UK utilities at the time of their 
privatisation in the eighties and nineties.  However the opening of the telecoms and energy markets 
has resulted in a variety of tariff structures offered by different suppliers.  This paper analyses the 
electricity tariffs offered by suppliers in different regions across the UK to identify a relationship 
between the running rate and the fixed element of the tariff.  We identify how this relationship 
varies according to regional characteristics and costs in different markets and according to different 
payment methods.  We also identify the impact of incumbency on price. 
 
Utilities constitute an important part of the economy, both for industry and households.  The 
products which they supply have important and sensitive environmental effects.  In particular the 
energy industries are responsible for half the carbon dioxide emissions, and constitute the main 
focus in the UK of attempts to reduce such emissions to comply with the Kyoto commitment.  In 
this context, the structure of tariffs is an important signal to consumers about the costs of the 
resources which they are consuming.   
 
As for all necessities, low income groups spend a higher than average proportion of their income on 
utilities. Price levels and structures therefore also have important and politically sensitive 
distributional consequences, witnessed by a history of political interference in nationalised industry 
tariffs, and a combination of government and regulatory influence in their privatised successors. 
Ofgem currently has an active Social Action Programme which addresses such distributional 
aspects.  In his seminal article on two-part tariffs, Oi (1971) recognised the importance of income 
redistribution effects in determining the superiority of two part to uniform tariffs in a monopoly 
setting (see also Brown and Sibley, 1986). 
 
The electricity supply industry is vertically divided into four stages: generation; high voltage, long 
distance transmission; regional distribution; and the retail function (sales and billing).  At 
privatisation the distribution and retail functions were jointly vested in fourteen regional companies, 
but these functions have recently been divided into separate organisations and haved subsequently 
devolved to different owners in many regions.  A company retailing electricity pays charges to the 
three upstream providers, i.e. to a generator for the energy, to National Grid Transco for 
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transmission through the network, and to a distribution company for local transport (the supply 
company may be vertically integrated with either a distribution or a generation provider, or both).  
Costs of residential energy have traditionally been classified as fixed, consumer related or 
consumption related. The consumer related costs are those of metering and billing, together with 
any consumer specific equipment, such as the exclusive pipe or wire into the house.  
 
When the retail part of energy markets were first opened to competition (from 1998 for households) 
most commentators predicted that prices would become more cost reflective. The nationalised area 
boards, predecessors to the regional electricity companies, had interpreted their ‘public service’ 
obligations by implementing widespread cross-subsidies through average cost pricing. This meant 
that consumers with high costs (those living in rural areas, consuming at times of peak demand, 
paying late or using more expensive prepayment meters) were subsidised by those with lower costs.  
Once the retail market was separated from distribution (which remains a monopoly), the cross-
subsidies in the retail sector would be eroded (see Waddams Price and Hancock, 1998).  This has 
occurred most obviously for payment method in energy. 
 
Before competition was introduced it was generally accepted that the fixed charge did not reflect 
the full costs of remaining attached to the system and the gas incumbent itself predicted a 
substantial rise in consumer charges in the very similar gas market (MMC, 1993).  However since 
the market was opened experience has been otherwise, with an erosion rather than an increase in the 
standing charge.   In April 2000 the same incumbent, British Gas, removed standing charges from 
its gas and electricity tariffs (replacing them with a two tier tariff with a higher per unit charge for 
the first few units than for subsequent consumption).  This move initiated a considerable widening 
in the variety of tariffs available from different companies.  This paper examines the relationship 
between unit price and standing charge, how it is affected by regional characteristics and by 
payment method.  We identify the effect of distribution and transmission costs, and of incumbency, 
on price structures.  In this way we are able to test earlier studies on market power (e.g. Otero and 
Waddams Price, 2001a). We also explore whether tariffs with two running rates but no standing 
charge, like that initiated by British Gas, have a fundamentally different relationship between the 
fixed element (captured by the higher charge for early units) and the effective marginal price which 
most consumers pay.   
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In the next section we explore the nature of the two part tariff in more detail, and  describe the data 
and its representation.  Section 3 presents the econometric model and the data, section 4 the results 
and section 5 the conclusions. 
 
2.  Pricing structure and tariffs 
 
We approach this analysis from the point of view of the firm and its revenue, its cost structure and 
some market characteristics which it faces.  In the areas where they are incumbent, companies 
retain over half the consumers (Ofgem, 2001), suggesting considerable market power, a factor 
which we explore in our analysis; the market can be typified as a dominant incumbent in each area, 
with a competitive fringe.  Early competition in these markets has been based on price savings 
available, compared with the incumbent, and indeed such savings form the main material supplied 
by energywatch in advising people to switch.   We are unable to identify marketing expenditure by 
firm and region, and focus on price.  However we also observe increasing attempts to differentiate 
what is essentially a homogeneous product through service provision.  
 
The tradition of two part tariffs in this industry has been based on efficiency rather than on 
extracting consumer surplus (Train, 1991).  A necessary condition for efficient pricing when the 
companies were monopolised was that price in each category (in this context predominantly 
consumer and energy related) should at least cover marginal costs, with fixed costs recovered 
through some form of Ramsey-Boiteux pricing.  This principle continued to be applied to regulated 
industries with market power, even after competition was introduced, for example the gas 
regulator’s rulings 1995-98 (see Otero and Waddams Price 2001b for a review of this process and 
the cost allocation involved).  In this context the presence of consumer related costs is crucial in 
determining the optimality of any two part tariff. 
 
For most utilities, consumer demand is likely to be more responsive to changes in the usage rate 
than in the fixed customer charge.  While some consumers might choose to do without gas and 
telephones, most would prefer to stay connected, and there is very little alternative to electricity.  
Therefore a Ramsey-Boiteux rule would suggest that a higher proportion of fixed charges should be 
recovered through the fixed consumer charge than through the usage charge.  Similar incentives 
apply to private monopolies maximising profit (Wilson, 1993), and these can be exacerbated by the 
particular form of regulation adopted for most UK utilities (Bradley and Price, 1988).  However 
there is little empirical evidence that regulated privatised companies responded to such incentives 
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before competition threatened (Giulietti and Waddams Price, 2000).  In telecoms, line rentals did 
increase significantly relative to unit charges, but technological change was probably the main 
impetus. 
 
The superiority of optional two part tariffs has long been known in a regulated or state owned 
monopoly setting (e.g Willig, 1978).  Wilson (1993) points out that such tariffs are common in 
competitive industries such as airlines and for advertising space, as well as in rental of 
photocopying machines.  A model with Bertrand competition would match the observations of 
firms in retail electricity both in offering unlimited quantities and in their attempts to differentiate 
the product.   
 
We use the following notation to denote the two-part tariffs which are offered. J companies j=1,…,J 
offer customers a quantity  kWh.  Consumers pay a price per unit  plus a standing 
charge  so that T  represents a potential customer's total bill for consumption 
level q.  We estimate the relation between  and over a sample of seventeen different brand 
names in fourteen different regions, and for three methods of payment.  Many of the distinct brand 
names have evolved from local incumbent suppliers who have since been taken over or merged 
with others.      
),0[ ∞∈q
qRC jj +
jRC
jSC SC=
jRC jSC
 
Investigating the relationship between  and raises the issue of simultaneity, given that both 
SC and RC are means by which the firm raises revenue, and are therefore likely to be determined 
together.   The way in which tariffs are marketed suggests that the flat rate is determined first.  
(Many companies advertise tariffs on the basis of low or zero standing charge, some on the basis of 
total bill but very few on the basis of low marginal energy costs
jSC jRC
1).  We therefore model the 
relationship as unit charge dependent on a standing charge which is determined by marketing 
strategy.  A general test of misspecification and a test of exogeneity of standing charges is used to 
test this intuition. 
 
We included tariffs with no standing charge, but with a high unit charge for the first few units, and 
tariffs with a standing charge and two running rates.  We have reconfigured these tariffs as having 
‘virtual’ standing charges and a single energy charge for consumption levels above that where the 
                                                          
1 An exception is TXU’s staywarm tariff, where charge is determined by size of house and household rather than 
consumption, but which is only available to pensioners.  This tariff has not been included in the analysis. 
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lower unit charge is applicable.  We compare results from these ‘virtual’ standing charges with 
those of the more conventional two part tariffs (a description of how we obtain this virtual standing 
charge is given in appendix B).   
 
The companies whose tariffs we examine are the surviving electricity incumbents and some new 
entrants to the industry.  Not all companies operate in all regions, but there were seven former 
Public Electricity Suppliers  operating nationwide, using thirteen of the brand names.  The other 
four brands are entrants to the market, by far the largest of which, British Gas, is the incumbent in 
the gas market.   The fourteen regions are those in England, Scotland and Wales which were 
formerly defined by Public Electricity Suppliers.  Retailers must pay for the energy they supply, but 
costs for individual retailers are confidential.   Distribution costs form 25-30% of the final bill and 
vary across regions according to the charges levied by the local distribution company, but are levied 
equally on all suppliers using that distribution network.  Distribution charges are generally in the 
form of a two part tariff, a charge per consumers and a charge per unit of electricity carried, and are 
usually higher for prepayment than for other consumers (see below for definition of payment 
methods).  Transmission costs account for about 10% of residential final bills and vary by region.  
Both distribution and transmission costs are included in our analysis. 
 
Costs of retailing depend on payment method, quite apart from any additional prepayment element 
in the distribution charge.   The three payment methods are standard credit (payment in arrears after 
receipt of a quarterly bill); direct debit (monthly amounts deducted directly from a consumer’s bank 
account); and prepayment, where supply is activated by insertion in the meter of a precharged 
‘smart card’ or key.   Automated direct debit is the cheapest for the retail company to operate, and 
prepayment the most expensive because of the cost of handling frequent small cash transactions. 
We estimated three regressions relating unit prices to standing charges, one for each payment 
method.  
 
The fourteen areas effectively constitute separate markets (resale of electricity is impractical and 
usually illegal); we include characteristics of these markets, viz. the total number of consumers, the 
average income in that region and the geographical area covered.  We allow for brand dummies that 
will capture any supplier specific factors which are reflected in tariffs, and test for significant 
differences between brands which are owned by the same company.  We use British Gas, the most 
successful entrant, which offers tariffs in all regions, as our base case in the non parsimonious 
model.   
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3 Econometric model and data 
 
We suggested above that there is an implicit function relating the two components of the tariff, 
standing charge and unit charge. Given the affine structure of the two part tariff, we construct a 
simple functional relationship.   This could be considered as the trade-off between the two parts of 
the tariff, where one must be increased if the other is reduced, to maintain the same level of revenue 
(Gibson and Price, 1986)    In this  paper we specify that function, assuming initially that it is linear. 
We use the running charge as the primary endogenous variable and standing charge as the 
endogenous control variable.  The statistical significance of a linear relationship would confirm  the 
substitutability of two part tariff structures in contributing to revenue.   A single price would not 
have this flexibility.  Companies who add a second unit rate to their tariff might do so to increase 
the flexiblility of their pricing policy even further.  This is of particular interest at a time of 
deregulation, when competition may induce innovative tariff structures (Bennett et. al., 2002).   
 
The generic model is 
 
+++++= ∑ = mrmmrmJj jmjrjmmrjmmrj FDCVDCSVSCSCRC 43,...1 2,12,11, ααααα  
,,,98765
m
rjrj
m
r
m
r
m
r
m
r
m eINCIARECUSTC +++++ ααααα  
r=1,…, , j=1,…J,  m = standard credit, direct debit, prepayment   (1) jR
 
We denote by T  the number of observations in each equation with  the number of 
regions (distribution areas) where a supplier j offers its tariffs. Our formulation accounts for the fact 
that though we have the same number of observations in each payment method equation, we do not 
have an identical number of regions for each supplier.   
∑ == Jj jR,...1 jR
m
rjRC , = unit price in pence per kWh of a two part tariff for the payment method m offered in region 
r by supplier j, or the final running rate where there is more than one; 
m
rjSC , = annual standing charge in pence; 
m
rjVSC , = dummy which takes the value 1 for tariffs having more than one unit price and for which a 
“virtual” annual standing charge was computed, otherwise 0; 
Sj = company dummy which takes the value 1 if the tariff belongs to supplier j ; 
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m
rVDC = distribution charge in pence per kWh; 
 mrFDC = annual distribution charge in pence;  
rTC = transmission charge in pence per kWh;  
CUSr = number of distribution customers in region r for all payment methods; 
INCj,r = dummy which takes the value one if the tariff is offered by a company j that is incumbent 
in the corresponding region r; 
=rARE size of the distribution region r 
=rI  gross income per head in region r 
m
rje ,  = residual of the equation corresponding to the payment method m. 
 
Each equation estimates the rate at which companies substitute unit price for standing charges, 
which we expect to be negative since they are complements for the company in terms of raising 
revenue.   Firms facing higher costs (distribution or transmission) would charge a higher unit price 
for any given standing charge, so we  would expect the coefficients on these costs to be positive.  
Costs, especially marketing costs, may also be increased (with similar consequences) for markets 
with larger physical areas.  A higher number of consumers may allow for some economies of scale 
in retailing, which would lead to lower unit charge for any level of standing charge, i.e. be 
associated with a negative coefficient.   
 
In terms of market characteristics, areas with higher income may be associated with higher standing 
charges, since consumption is positively related to income, but at a decreasing rate.  The 
prepayment market caters for lower income consumers than other tariffs, and so the relationship 
between standing charge and unit price may be different.    However we expect a tariff for a given 
supplier in a particular region to be correlated across the three payment methods, and this affects the 
methodology used. 
 
Market power of incumbents, all of whom had retained a market share of more than 50%, would be 
reflected in higher level tariffs, and a positive coefficient for the incumbency dummy.  Since we 
have identified suppliers by the brand names used, we also test for similarities in the relationship 
bewteen different brand names used by the same company in different regional areas.    
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We rewrite (1) in compact form for each payment method equation 
  
prepayment debit,direct  credit, standard, =+= mmmmm eβXy  (2) 
 
3.1 Data 
 
We have 152 sets of pricing data relating to 14 regions, 17 brand names and three payment 
methods.  The pricing data are from the energywatch website.  Transmission charges are available 
from the National Grid Transco web site (National Grid Transco, 2002).  Distribution use of system 
charges are published by the Electricity Association (Electricity Association 2001) and comprise 
fixed and variable elements, the former charged per consumer and the latter per unit of energy 
distributed.  We use the total annual charge levied for a typical domestic customer with a demand of 
3300kWh per year.  The transmission charges are those levied during the period 16:00 hours to 
19:00 hours. Figures for both distribution and transmission charges were for the year 2002. 
Table 1 shows  descriptive statistics for the main variables of the models.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev.
 
Minimum 
Value 
 
Maximum 
Value 
 
Unit price p/kWh : 
    
  Direct debit 5.648 .566 4.61 7.07 
  Standard credit 5.816 .557 4.72 7.28 
  Prepayment 6.390 .605 4.86 7.28 
    Global 5.951 .657 4.61 7.28 
 
Standing Charge ps pa : 
    
  Direct debit 3854 1166 1432 7008 
  Standard credit 4367 1076 1432 7008 
  Prepayment 5649 1788 1153 12201
    Global 4623 1571 1153 12201 
Unit distribution Charge p/kWh :     
  Non prepayment a  1.300 .369 .86 2.02 
  Prepayment 1.343 .350 .86 2.02 
 
Fixed distribution Charge 
ps pa per consumer : 
    
  Non prepayment  1495 658 0 2471 
  Prepayment 2563 1144 1139 4000 
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Transmission Charge p/kWh : 
 
1.138 
 
.472 
 
.178 
 
1.998 
 
Distribution Customers, 000 : 
 
1804 
 
663 
 
592 
 
3261 
 
Size of distribution area, sq kms  : 
 
16028 
 
11405 
 
665 
 
54390 
 
Average gross income/head, £spa : 
 
15232 
 
1959 
 
12743 
 
20300 
 
 
Because we expect similarities in the relationship across the three tariffs for a given market and 
supplier, we ran a least squares regression for each payment method separately and investigated the 
correlation between the estimated residuals of the three equations.  Correlation between the 
residuals for the standard credit and direct debit equations is significant at 1%; for prepayment and 
standard credit at 10% and between prepayment and direct debit at 20%.  Because of this 
correlation between the residuals we use a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) approach.   
Before estimating the SUR we tested for conditional heteroskedasticity within each equation in the 
model including all continuous variables using White’s  (1980) asymptotic  test, and do not 
reject homoskedasticity for the first and third equation.   The result of the test also supports the 
linear model specification for these equations.  However, for direct debit, we reject this hypothesis.  
A computation of the coefficient of variations of the running charges show that this element of the 
two-part tariffs vary more across companies and regions, perhaps reflecting an attempt by suppliers 
to differentiate their tariffs more in this more actively competitive market.  In the non parsimonious 
model (shown in the appendix as table 4) we chose British Gas as the base group since it is the 
major non incumbent player.  To derive the parsimonious version, reported in table 2, companies 
were eliminated through a stepwise regression in each equation before estimating the pooled sample 
regression.  It is this group of ‘excluded companies’ which forms the base case for the parsimonious 
version.   
2χ
 
We investigated the exogeneity of standing charge in the three equations simultaneously. There 
might be obvious reasons to think that standing charges in a two part tariff are not exogenous. This 
non-exogeneity could explain the failure of the White misspecification test for the direct debit 
equation, reported above. In order to test simultaneously for the exogeneity of standing charges in 
the three equations of the SUR model we used the level of standing charges for the first period for 
which this was available.  In most cases this was February 1999, but for companies such as 
Amerada, Basic Power who entered the market later, we used the first published tariff.  We employ 
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the Hausman (1978)'s endogeneity test on the pooled sample regression of the SUR model. The 
motivation is that if there is a misspecification due to the non exogeneity of one standing charge in a 
particular equation, this misspecification would be transmitted throughout the system, so it is more 
relevant to test for the exogeneity on the pooled estimates2.  We did not find evidence of 
endogeneity even at 10 per cent (the results are available upon request from the authors). 
 
4. Results 
 
 
Table 2. Parsimonious SUR results  
 Standard Credit Direct Debit Prepayment 
Standing Charge ***
)10(1.23
4-
5-
012.49-
×
×   ***
)10(1.28
4-
5-
012.55-
×
×  ***
)10(1.61
5-
5-
019.12-
×
×  
Virtual Standing Charge   ***
(.016)
.139  
  
  Amerada    ***
(.067)
.817  
  Atlantic **
(.044)
.111-   ***
(.045)
.292-  
 
  Basic Power ***
(.050)
.216-   ***
(.053)
.183  ***
(.081)
.933-  
  London ***
(.023)
.103-    ***
(.068)
.191-  
  Manweb   ***
(.073)
.269   
  Northern **
(.075)
.162     
                                                          
2 In each equation of the SUR we inserted the estimated residual from a regression of  on the exogenous variables 
of the  equation plus our instrument variable. We then estimated this augmented SUR model. 
mSC
thm
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  npower ***
(.023)
.190-    ***
(.097)
.529-  
  Powergen ***
(.045)
.191   ***
(.048)
.302  ***
(.067)
.443-  
  Scottish Hydro **
(.113)
.277   ***
(.117)
.326  
 
  TXU ***
(.044)
.278   ***
(.045)
.180   
   British Gas    ***
(.066)
.400-  
  Constant ***
(.169)
5.22   ***
(.145)
4.80  ***
(.169)
6.48  
Variable Distribution Charge  ***
(.054)
0.871   ***
(.056)
0.894  ***
(.063)
0.603  
Annual Distribution charge ***
)10(2.54
4-
5-
102.41
×
×   ***
)10(2.60
4-
5-
102.52
×
×   
Transmission charge ***
(.028)
.270   ***
(.029)
.257   
Distribution customers ***
)10(2.73
4-
5-
101.38-
×
×   ***
)10(2.77
4-
5-
101.29-
×
× ***
)10(3.51
4-
5-
101.50-
×
×  
Distribution area ***
)10(1.26
6-
6-
105.04
×
×   ***
)10(1.30
6-
6-
105.54
×
×   
Incumbency ***
(.045)
0.579   ***
(.045)
0.701  ***
(.066)
0.191  
Adj. 2R  .911  .913 .848 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. *. Significant at 10%. **. Significant at 5%. ***. Significant at 1%. 
Standard errors estimated with White (1980)’s robust HAC matrix. 
 12
Brands eliminated from parsimonious estimation: Southern, Scottish Power, Swalec, SWEB, 
SEEBOARD, Yorkshire.  Gross income per head and annual distribution charges for prepayment 
consumers were not significant at 10%. 
  
As expected, we see a negative relationship between unit price and standing charge.  For each one 
hundred pounds higher annual standing charge, the unit rate decreases by two and a half pence for 
standard credit and direct debit tariffs. The estimates of the coefficient of standing charges are not 
significantly different from each other in these two equations.  This is a direct result of the structure 
of the discounts given for direct debit payment.  Discounts for direct debit are shown in the lower 
value of the constant, while the slope coefficient relating running and standing charges remains the 
same.    The relationship between the tariffs for different payment methods is shown in figure 1. 
    
Figure 1: relation between running rate and standing charge for prepayment and credit 
tariffs 
 
 
      Running rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Standing Charge 
 
Fig. 1     Relationship between Running rate and Standing Charge 
Prepayment               Standard Credit          Direct Debit 
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For prepayment tariffs the coefficient of standing charge is just over a third of that for the credit 
tariffs.  For a household using the average annual consumption of electricity, 3,300 kWh, a pound 
decrease in the standing charge would be balanced by about an extra eighty pence energy charge for 
those on quarterly credit or direct debit tariffs.  However a prepayment consumer with the same 
consumption would save only 30 pence on fuel charges by switching to a tariff with a one pound 
higher annual standing charge.  Since average consumption of prepayment consumers is likely to be 
slightly less than for those on credit tariffs, the reduction in fuel charges would be even less.   
 
The summary statistics in table 1 show that the average levels of both standing charge and unit price 
are higher for prepayment than for other payment methods, and this is reflected in the higher 
constant, and illustrated in figure 1.  The constant could be regarded as the average running rate that 
would be charged if there were no standing charge.  But in practice we see that such tariffs have two 
running rates, so this interpretation is misleading, and effectively there is always at least a ‘virtual’ 
standing charge.  We would expect the final running rate to be a little higher for tariffs with no 
standing charge, to compensate for the lower revenue from consumers who use small amounts of 
electricity.  We find that this is indeed the case for direct debit tariffs where the running rate is on 
average 0.14 pence higher for the same (implied) standing charge.  We now identify the other 
factors that affect this trade off between standing charge and running rate.   
 
An increase in any of the costs paid by supply companies for distribution and transmission raises 
the running rate paid for any given standing charge to the same extent on both credit and direct 
debit tariffs.  Almost 90% of an increase in the variable distribution charge, and a quarter of an 
increase in transmission charge is passed on in the unit price.  A one pound increase in the annual 
distribution charge per customer translates into about an increase of about a fortieth of a penny on 
the running charge, and annual cost of about 80 pence for the average user.   
 
However for prepayment customers only the variable distribution charge seems to affect the 
running rate, and of this only 60% is passed on directly in the charge per kWh (compared with 
about 90% for the credit tariffs).  The lower direct feed through into unit rates is partly reflected in 
the higher constant in the equation for prepay tariffs. 
 
In markets which cover a greater area, there is a small but significantly higher unit charge for credit 
consumers, but not for prepayment customers.  This is consistent with higher marketing costs in 
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large areas, since there is much less aggressive marketing of prepayment tariffs.  Higher consumer 
numbers (i.e. a bigger total market of consumers paying by all payment methods) lead to some 
reduction in unit prices to the same extent in all three payment methods, suggesting some 
economies of scale which are passed on in lower tariffs.  The average income in an area does not 
affect the price relationship for any of the three payment methods.   
 
We see that wherever a consumer is, the unit energy charge (for any given consumer charge) is 
likely to be significantly greater if bought from the local incumbent.  The mark up varies between 
payment methods in a rather surprising way.  It is highest for direct debit consumers (about 0.7 
pence, twelve per cent of the average unit price), where consumer switching has been highest, 44% 
in 2001,  the latest date for which such detailed figures are available (Ofgem, 2001).  Just under a 
third of credit and prepayment consumers had switched at this time, where the incumbency markups 
are  three fifths and one fifth of a penny, 7% and 2% respectively.   
 
While electricity is essentially a homogeneous product, companies make great efforts to 
differentiate their services, and we explored whether the price relationship varies between brands, 
apart from incumbency.  In the parsimonious equation, five brands act as the base group, namely 
Scottish Power, SWALEC, SWEB, SEEBOARD and Yorkshire.  All had been regional incumbents, 
but SWALEC, SWEB, and Yorkshire were offering tariffs only in their local areas, and operating 
under other brand names elsewhere.  The two brands with close to national coverage who form the 
base group are Scottish Power and SEEBOARD, and brand dummies indicate differences from this 
base pair.   
 
Across the market as a whole the model identifies a little more brand differentiation for standard 
credit than for the other two payment methods, with eight brand dummies significantly different 
from the base group rather than six.  The maximum spread between company dummies is greater 
for prepayment than for the other payment methods, both including and excluding the smaller 
entrants.  Of the incumbent brands with wide coverage who are not in the base group, London and 
npower charge less for standard credit and prepayment than the base pair, but there is no difference 
in direct debit charges;  TXU charges more for both standard credit and direct debit, with no 
difference for prepayment; while Powergen charges more for standard credit and direct debit and 
less for prepayment.  Manweb and Northern both have higher charges for one payment group, and 
Scottish Hydro for two, but are marketed only in their original incumbency region.    
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We compare these tariff differences with the percentage of consumers who have switched away 
from the incumbent suppliers in each area.  Of those companies whose brands are associated with  
higher tariffs (Northern, TXU, Manweb and Scottish Hydro), the first three have experienced 
consumers leaving at above average rates  (41% and 39% compared with an average of 36%), while 
the fourth has a very low switching rate (19%) probably because of the particular characteristics and 
loyalty in that part of Scotland and the vertical integration of the Scottish electricity industry.  
Similarly London, associated with lower prices, has experienced lower than average switching rates 
in its incumbent area (32%).  This provides some evidence that consumers may respond to 
incumbent prices in deciding whether to switch.   
 
The main entrant into the market is British Gas, which charges less for prepayment, but has similar 
tariffs (when everything else is taken into account) to the base group.  Other entrants (Amerada, 
Atlantic and Basic Power) all show some differences.  Basic Power is cheaper for standard credit 
and prepayment consumers, but more expensive for direct debit; while Atlantic is cheaper for both 
credit tariffs, and Amerada is more expensive for prepayment users.   
 
Since there has been rapid consolidation in the electricity supply industry, we used the brand 
dummies to explore whether those in similar groups demonstrated more similar tariffs than those 
outside the groups.   
 
Table 3: Electricity supply brand names within the same ownership group 
Group 
Identity 
  
A London, SWEB, SEEBOARD* 
B Manweb, Scottish Power 
C Northern, npower (incumbent in Midlands), Yorkshire 
D Scottish Hydro, Southern, SWALEC 
E PowerGen (incumbent in East Midlands), TXU* (incumbent in Eastern and 
North West regions) 
* acquired after the data analysed here 
 
We see from tables 2 and 3 that some but not all members of four of the groups (A, B, C and D) are 
included in the base, and therefore not significantly different from each other.  Within group A, 
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London charges significantly different tariffs from SWEB and SEEBOARD (both part of the base 
group), although London has owned SWEB for three years.  In group B, Manweb charges 
significantly higher direct debit tariffs than Scottish Power (which is in the base group).   In group 
C, npower has national coverage, while both Northern and Yorkshire charge significantly higher 
standard credit tariffs, and Yorkshire charges higher standard and prepayment tariffs than its parent.  
In group D it is Scottish Hydro which is the outlier, charging higher prices than others in its group 
in the standard credit and direct debit markets.  Powergen and TXU, who amalgamated about six 
months after these price data, now in group E, are both outside the base group, and show dummy 
coefficients significantly different from each other in the direct debit and prepayment markets.  This 
suggests little evidence that brands within the same group are more similar than brands under 
different ownership. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The most remarkable difference in the general pattern is that between the two credit and the 
prepayment tariffs.  There is no significant difference between the coefficients of any of the cost 
and market variables in the credit and direct debit tariff.  The only differences are in the constant, 
the incumbency coefficient and the shift associated with multipart tariffs.  The smaller constant for 
direct debit reflects the lower costs associated with such payment, but is partly a reflection of the 
(necessarily arbitrary) choice of the base group.   
 
The significance of the virtual standing charge coefficient for direct debit but not for other payment 
methods is somewhat surprising.  If the role of the higher ‘final’ running rate in such tariffs is to 
recoup revenue lost by those who use little electricity, and so do not fully cover the fixed costs of 
supply, then prices would be higher for tariffs where such low demand is more likely.  Since 
average consumption of direct debit consumers is higher rather than lower than those on other 
tariffs, this may indicate some cross subsidy of low consumption prepay and credit consumers by 
high consumption direct debit users.  Most intriguing is the relative size of the incumbency 
coefficients for different payment methods.  A positive coefficient could be interpreted as indicating 
some continuing market power of incumbents, identified in Otero and Waddams Price (2001a), and 
in Giulietti et al (2001), both using 1999 data.   However we note that the mark ups are higher both 
in absolute and relative terms for those payment methods where most switching has occurred, 
suggesting that caution is needed in interpreting the results as a direct indication of market power.  
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In a dynamic market of this kind, it may be that that the lower mark up by incumbents for 
prepayment reflects the fact that incumbents’ prices have been more recently regulated, and that 
entrants have not yet significantly undercut these prices.   
 
Prepayment tariffs are much less sensitive to changes in costs than prices for other payment 
methods.  Indeed differences in transmission charges and the fixed element of  distribution costs 
seem to have no impact on tariffs, while only 0.6 of any increase in unit distribution charges are 
passed on, compared with about 0.9 for credit tariffs, a considerable difference even allowing for a 
one per cent higher average cost for prepayment.   Similarly, the area of the distribution market has 
no effect on prepayment tariffs, while increasing the charge for credit tariffs, perhaps reflecting 
higher marketing costs across larger market area.  The higher the number of distribution customers 
in a market the lower the tariffs, with similar coefficients across payment methods, suggesting some 
economies of scale in billing activities in larger markets (the numbers are for all payment methods, 
since we did not have separate figures for each payment method).  The average income per head in 
a region did not have a significant effect on the tariffs charged.  While some brands have 
consistently higher or lower tariffs for some payment methods across markets, there seems little 
relationships between ownership of a brand and the tariffs it charges, even after several years of 
common ownership.   
 
We see that while tariffs with fixed charges may be unpopular, they persist in these industries to 
reflect the predominance of costs associated with being a customer, rather than how much is 
consumed.  Where they have been replaced by tariffs with an initial high running rate, the final 
running rate is rather higher for credit and direct debit tariffs.  This is part of convincing evidence 
that the credit market (including direct debit) is a separate market from that for prepayment.  Across 
the variables we see considerable similarity between direct debit and standard credit tariff 
structures, and corresponding differences between them and the prepayment structure.  Cost 
differences which can be observed (transmission and distribution) are reflected much more closely 
in the credit tariffs.  If higher area implies larger marketing costs, these seem not to be recovered 
from the prepayment market, either because they are not incurred for these consumers or because of 
allocation decisions within the firm.  Demand characteristics of areas such as average income levels 
do not seem to affect any of the tariffs.  However the effect of incumbency, while raising prices for 
all payment methods, does so much more for credit than for prepayment tariffs, although 
competition for credit customers has been much fiercer in the early days of the competitive 
electricity market. 
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After allowing for all these differences the unit charge for prepayment customers is higher, and does 
not fall so quickly if standing charge increases as for the credit tariffs.  This may partly reflect the 
higher supply costs of prepayment, through handling cash.  But it is also probably a reflection of the 
more recent regulation of these tariffs.  As the final price controls are removed from retail 
electricity tariffs, these results raise important issues for future regulation of the market under the 
provisions of the Competition Act 1998.  The regulator needs to monitor both the mark ups which 
incumbents are able to charge, and the trend of this price differential over time, as well as how 
active consumers are in switching.  Incumbent mark ups may be a disequilibrium sign of vigorous 
discounting by entrants, and their absence, as in the prepayment market, may indicate only 
lackadaisical rather than enthusiastic competition.  However continuation of incumbent mark ups in 
equilibrium would raise two sets of concerns.  First, If the market does not erode such price 
differentials it suggests that incumbents are able to abuse market power.  Secondly, if particular 
groups of consumers are less likely to switch away from incumbents charging higher prices, it raises 
distributive concerns.  This will be of particular concern to the regulator and the consumer 
watchdog, both of whom have statutory duties to take account of the needs of certain potentially 
vulnerable categories of households.  The different market structures also suggest that the regulator 
needs to continue separate monitoring of the prepayment market, where tariffs show very different 
characteristics from those in credit markets, and whose consumers have lower than average income. 
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Appendix A. 
 
Table 4. Non parsimonious SUR results of Unit prices for  Standard Credit, 
Direct Debit and Prepayment (base company: British Gas) 
 
 Standard Credit Direct Debit Prepayment 
Standing charge (SC) ***
)10(1.22
4-
6-
012.63-
×
×  ***
)10(4.05
4-
6-
012.49-
×
×  ***
)10(4.15
5-
6-
018.39-
×
×  
Virtual Standing 
Charge (VSC) dummy 
.233 ***
(.003)
  ***
(.013)
.220  ***
(.03)
.114  
Suppliers(S)     
  Amerada ***
(.004)
.190  ***
(.016)
.054-  ***
(.035)
1.311  
  Atlantic ***
(.004)
.099  ***
(.016)
.219-  ***
(.033)
.594  
  Basic Power 
(.004)
.006-  ***
(.017)
.239  ***
(.036)
.456-  
  London ***
(.005)
.021  (.019)
.019  ***
(.035)
.285  
  Manweb ***
(.007)
.355  ***
(.025)
.497  ***
(.04)
.496  
  Northern ***
(.006)
.409  ***
(.020)
.266  ***
(.025)
.375  
  npower ***
(.005)
.029-  (.020)
.007  *
(.041)
.079-  
  Powergen ***
(.004)
.379  ***
(.015)
.378  (.034)
.058  
SEEBOARD ***
(.003)
.058-  (.009)
.004-  ***
(.013)
.376  
  Scottish Hydro ***
(.010)
.488  ***
(.032)
.408  ***
(.037)
.430  
  Southern ***
(.004)
.170  ***
(.016)
.100  ***
(.032)
.386  
  Scottish Power ***
(.005)
.258  ***
(.021)
.093  ***
(.033)
.538  
  SWALEC ***
(.007)
.326  (.026)
.032  ***
(.041)
.640  
  SWEB ***
(.007)
.214  ***
(.025)
.123  (.043)
.200  
  TXU ***
(.003)
.251  ***
(.009)
.177  ***
(.016)
.367  
  Yorkshire ***
(.007)
.103  ***
(.025)
.200  ***
(.040)
.332  
Constant ***
(.010)
5.103  ***
(.033)
4.756  ***
(.087)
6.00  
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  Per unit distribution 
charge (VDC) 
***
(.003)
0.875  ***
(.011)
0.881  ***
(.024)
0.566  
Annual Distribution 
charge (FDC) 
***
)10(1.60
4-
6-
2.53x10
×
 
***
)10(5.74
4-
6-
102.54
×
×  
)10(4.92
-6
6-
101.51
×
×  
Transmission  
Charge (TC) 
***
(.002)
.284  ***
(.008)
.284  ***
(.012)
.06  
Distribution customers 
(CUS)  
***
)10(1.73
4-
6-
101.30-
×
×  ***
)10(5.87
4-
6-
101.20-
×
×  ***
)10(9.00
4-
6-
101.51-
×
×  
Distribution area 
(ARE)  
***
)10(9.26
6-
-8
105.44
×
×  ***
)10(3.40
6-
7-
106.08
×
×  ***
)10(4.40
6-
7-
10.25-
×
×  
Gross income/head (Y) 
-  
***
)10(3.38
6-
7-
104.97
×
× ***
)10(1.13
6-
6-
105.5-
×
×  
)10(3.02
-6
6-
104.81-
×
×  
Incumbent (INC) ***
(.004)
0.521  ***
(.016)
0.65  ***
(.018)
0.228  
Adj. 2R  .913 .910 .841 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. *. Significant at 10%. **. Significant at 5%. ***. Significant at 1%. 
The t- statistics are computed using robust standard errors (White, 1980). 
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Appendix  B. Computing the Virtual Standing Charge 
 
Consider the most complex tariff we have in the sample.  It has two blocks, with the first steeper 
than the second, and has a standing charge. This tariff and hence the bill takes the form of a 
piecewise continuous function in , the level of consumption. Denote q ( )qT  the corresponding 
function 
 
( ) ( ) ,  ~ if ~,,
,~0 if 
212
11


≥+∆
≤≤+=
qqqpqpcc
qqqpC
qT  
 
where c  is the standing charge,  the initial running or per kWh charge, the per unit charge for 
consumption above quantity 
1 1p 2p
q~ , <. .   The ‘virtual’ standing charge  is defined as the 
standing charge which, if it were charged, would give the same total bill T(q) for consumption of 
q=
2p 1p 2c
q~ and a single running rate .    is found from the following equality 2p 2c qpcqpc ~~ 1122 +=+  
which implies that ( )q pqccc cp ∆+=∆,1( ) =
= ~22
qpc ∆ ~,,02
~,
pq∆~
1 . Accordingly, if there is no initial standing charge 
( ), then .   If there is a single block, then c0c1 = c =2 1c2 =  since . 0=∆p
 
 
 
 
 
 
( )qT 
 
 
2p
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 Fig. 2 ‘Virtual’ standing charge 
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